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While the primary expertise of a firm of engineering consultants 
or architects is that of design, moving down the chain, a process 
plant contractor may be more orientated towards expertise in 
contract management and procurement allied to licensed tech-
nology know-how, with supply and manufacturing risk passed to 
third-party suppliers and subcontractors. 
 
For major technology components such as heat exchangers and 
steam and gas turbines (often associated with significant re-
search and development costs) the emphasis switches to a manu-
facturing based contractor, with in-house engineering and con-
struction teams to design and install manufactured parts.  
 
At the other end of the process, the expertise of a construction 
team, such as a group of tunnel miners, may be centred around 
the provision and management of skilled and unskilled site la-
bour, allied to technology equipment from cranes to tunnel bor-
ing machines.  
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Introduction 
As technology has evolved over time, capital plant has become 
progressively more complex entailing, potentially, increased 
risks and uncertainties associated with engineering, manufacture 
and installation. Offsetting this trend, however, techniques to 
highlight problems, facilitate project control and reduce the po-
tential for risk and uncertainty have also become more sophisti-
cated, including PERT/CPA, financial analysis and, more re-
cently, Project Risk Management. While the application of such 
techniques has been commonplace in large projects such as 
power, defence, aerospace, industrial and civil infrastructure 
investment, the advent of the personal computer allied with to-
day’s user-friendly software, has also enabled these techniques 
to percolate downwards  to smaller construction projects.  
 
Where liability to recovery of contributions to overhead costs 
and profit has been agreed, and where records exist demonstrat-
ing with a reasonable degree of certainty the impact of disruption 
on a contract arising from owner-caused delays to the critical 
path, a recurring financial problem concerns the measurement of 
the opportunity cost arising — the lost contribution to overheads 
and profit, at whatever level in the business. 
 
A key element concerns the analysis and division of costs into 
those which are fixed or variable, or which are shorter or longer 
term in nature, the time over which they should be considered 
and the relevance or not of them to the contract dispute. While 
the technique of Marginal Cost Analysis clearly separates out 
these costs, agreement between owner and contractor is still 
required as to which categories the costs actually fit into with 
regard to a specific project or contract. In the very long term, all 
costs can be considered as variable, and overheads can vary in 
some proportion to general business levels, while in the very 
short term many costs are effectively fixed. In the middle ground 
there is a grey area where disputes can be more difficult to re-
solve. To complicate matters, the cost structures of the key play-
ers — engineers, contractors, manufacturers and constructors —  
are often quite different in nature from each other, and the size 
of players varies, from the one-man architect up to the large-
scale providers such as Siemens or  Alsthom. 
 
A number of financial formulae
1 have been developed to attempt 
to simplify the estimation of quantum. They rest on particular 
hypotheses concerning the relationship of overheads (i.e. sup-
posedly fixed) to turnover or costs (i.e. supposedly variable), 
whether planned or actual, or to the delay period. It is not sur-
prising that using different formulae can produce quite different 
results. This is not to say, however, that the Court should simply 
ignore such efforts to elucidate the costs of delay, but rather to 
seek the best-fit representation of the facts as presented to it, on 
which to make a judgement. 
Project Management 








1.  Hudson, Eichleay, Emden, Ernstrom, Carteret, Allegheny 
Figure 1. Project Costs/Resource over Time 
Project / Contract Cost Structure 
The format of a project is generally a combination of processes; 
initial design and engineering, followed by manufacture & pro-
curement, and then construction & installation. The exact combi-
nation of these depends upon the market being served and the way 
individual corporations have adapted their expertise to meet the 
market.  
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A provider of a product or service buys in outside products/
services and adds value to them, with which to recompense em-
ployees and providers of capital, and reinvest in the business.  
 
The table at figure 3 below summarises raw data for one year of 
a range of different sized companies, chosen to illustrate some of 
the dynamics of this process. The list is not an exhaustive one. 
The sources of the data obtained were Perfect Analysis, FAME 
and company accounts. Companies chosen included UK regis-
tered companies/subsidiaries, or European companies. US and 
Japanese companies were not selected because their accounts 
generally do not publish details of employee wage costs. The list 
below is placed in Added Value order. Figures for ABB group 
relate to 1998, prior to merger of interests with Alstom 
 
In most of the large groups, only parts are engaged in engineer-
ing contracting activities. While about half of Alstom is con-
cerned with power engineering, in the case of Rolls Royce, only 
about 10% of activity is directed to energy work, similar to Sie-
mens. Where possible, subsidiaries of the larger groups have 
been researched, and further analyses in this report concentrates 
on those rather than their parent companies. 
Make or Buy, Provide Service/Subcontract Out 
A key ratio for the market is the extent to which firms subcon-
tract value production (and associated risk and control over 
costs) to other suppliers. This is normally measured by the ratio 
of added value/gross income, but for purposes of contract analy-
sis, other income such as interest received and share of profits of 
associated companies is ignored, and the ratio reduces to that of 
added value/turnover. The higher the ratio, the less value that is 
sourced to outside suppliers and subcontractors.  
 
A pure contractor is likely to subcontract most of the value pro-
duction to others, retaining a margin for contract management 
costs and profit. A manufacturer, on the other hand, may buy  in 
raw materials and components, to do substantial work  on and to 
fit to complex plant, before installing in the factory or on site. It 
may also have to invest in substantial capital plant and research 
& development in furtherance of its business.  
 
It might be expected that a firm of engineering consultants 
would have a very high ratio, but even here items such as rent, 
insurance, stationery, computers and software, interest paid, 
utilities, advertising and subcontract staffing subtract from turn-
over. The level of the ratio for a pure constructor will depend 
upon the amount of labour that is subcontracted to smaller con-
struction teams and self-employed labourers. 
 
The chart at figure 4 below shows the extent to which some 
companies add value. Averages have been computed over peri-
ods of up to 10 years’ history for each company up to 2003. For 
some companies the period of history was shorter than this, ow-
ing partly to ease of availability of data, but also to be consistent 
in comparing ratios. There have been some significant changes 
in the market over the years, in particular the switches of owner-
ship of turbine production among GEC, ABB, Alstom, Westing-
house and Siemens, complicated by significant losses for some 
groups, and the introduction of the Euro. 
Figure 4. Average Percent Ratio Added Value / Turnover 
(Number of years, over which average calculated,  in brackets) 
At the top of the scale are the engineering consultants and pro-
fessionals, where added value constitutes 40-60% of turnover 
(and therefore outsourced costs 60-40%). At the other end of the 
scale contractors and constructors add only about 20% of value 
to output, with 80% being outsourced. In between are the manu-
facturers adding 30-50%.  
 
  SALES TURNOVER (TO)  Net VAT, Excise duties 
+  Other Income  Share of profits of associated  
companies, interest received  
=  GROSS INCOME   
-  Bought out costs  Materials, components, services, 
utility costs, interest paid 
=  ADDED VALUE (AV)   
-  Wage costs (WC)  Wages, social security, 
pensions, profit sharing 
=  PROFIT before Depreciation  Profit before tax + 
depreciation & amortisation 
Figure 2. Structure of Added Value 
Figure 3. Some Companies with Project Activities 
Added Value 
A possible means of highlighting the key differences between 
the main players, and of throwing some light on the question of 
overheads is by reference to added value analysis. Figure 2 sum-
marises the generally accepted structure of added value: 










      M £ $ €  M £ $ €   
Siemens   9.03  €  74233  32458  419300 
ABB  12.98  $  30872  19037  199232 
Alstom   3.03  €  21351  4397  109671 
BAE Systems  12.02  £  8076  2794  69400 
Rolls-Royce  12.02  £  5788  1897  39200 
AMEC  12.02  £  3213  899  22964 
Kellogg Brown & Root Holdings (UK)  12.01  £  2154  693  14988 
Carillion  12.02  £  1847  490  16959 
W S Atkins   3.03  £  935  448  15450 
Taylor Woodrow  12.02  £  2209  436  6030 
Alstom Power UK Holdings  3.02  £  1027  319  4613 
AMEC Capital Projects  12.02  £  987  238  6608 
Alfred McAlpine  12.02  £  768  213  6476 
Carillion Construction  12.02  £  856  147  4125 
Mitsui Babcock Energy  3.03  £  260  136  3772 
Foster Wheeler Europe  (13m )  12.01  £  597  120  4478 
Taylor Woodrow Construction  12.02  £  445  91  3291 
Rolls-Royce Power Engineering  12.02  £  642  80  3474 
McAlpine Capital Projects  12.02  £  361  52  1149 
Fluor Ltd  12.02  £  223  42  625 
Bechtel Holdings Ltd (UK)  12.01  £  256  35  1279 
Aker Kvaerner Projects Ltd (UK)   12.02  £  59  22  633 
Merz & McClellan Parsons Brinckerhoff  10.02  £  40  16  485 
Davy Process Technology Ltd  12.02  £  30  16  170 
AMEC International Construction  12.02  £  59  15  342 
Stone & Webster   8.02  £  23  14  243 
Snamprogetti  12.02  £  29  9  267 
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W S At ki ns Pl c [9]Some scatter in the ratio is to be expected for given specialities, 
the relative make or buy situation, and relative profitability in 
any one year. Some companies such as Alstom and Rolls Royce 
Power Engineering have had particularly turbulent recent profit 
histories and their ratio is lower than might otherwise have been 
expected. 
 
A simple statistical measure of scatter over the years considered 
can be obtained by dividing the standard deviation of a ratio for 
a company over a period by the mean of the ratio calculated over 
the same time period. Among all the companies over the periods 
examined, on average about 2/3rds of data scatter occurs within 
a range of ± 25% either side of the mean level. Thus for an ex-
pected added value/turnover ratio of 32%, a range of about 24—
40% might cover 2/3rd of the data variations. Clearly, however, 
some companies have higher or lower scatter of the ratio than 
this over the periods of years examined. It should be pointed out 
that care should be exercised in the interpretation of standard 
deviations and means calculated from small samples. 
 
Overheads 
Overheads, defined as costs not allocable directly to contracts, 
can occur at all levels of a business, and not just at the head/
home office.  In a factory or on a construction site it may not be 
possible always to charge all of the cost of shop-floor manage-
ment to a contract. If a foreman is underemployed or his/her time 
is spent on non-contract activities,  then  the cost of underutilisa-
tion has an effect on recoverable costs and a reduction in profit 
level occurs. This might reasonably be regarded just as part of 
the relative efficiency of the firm. In a competitive situation, 
firms have to judge whether they can charge more for particular 
underutilised resources, or take a reduction in profit. At the 
home office level, typical costs include: 
•  Executive wage costs and expenses of senior management & staff in 
accounts, human resources, marketing & selling, legal services 
•  Head office utility and IT costs 
•  Advertising, rent of premises & machines, professional services 
•  Depreciation & amortisation (D&A) 
•  Interest on borrowings  (Int) 
•  Research & development not allocable to a contract (R&D) 
 
Among these are a number that are not a part of the added value 
of the firm, such as interest paid, utility costs, and sub-contract 
services. They form part of the bought-out costs. Depreciation 
and amortisation (D&A), ordinarily regarded as parts of over-
heads and deductions against tax, effectively have similar prop-
erties to profit, in that they are potential sources of cash flow to 
fund capital expenditure to invest in the future. The diagram at 
figure 5 illustrates how overheads fit into the scheme of added 
value. 
 
Overhead costs vary in a number of ways, but in general are 
affected by: 
•  Overall level of output of the business 
•  Relative resources required to manage added value 
•  Business cycle, often  lagging changes in profitability 
•  Investment and R&D requirements 
•  Relative ease or not of being able to book costs to projects  
•  Costs of financing the business and contract cash flow 
 
Accounts for most public companies include a breakdown of 
overheads into marketing & selling, administration and R & D. 
Figures for D&A, while included in administration, are sepa-
rately stated elsewhere. Thus it is possible to split up overheads 
into separate items, for the purposes of analysis to assist in dis-
pute resolution. In figure 6, a Net Overhead (NO) item has been 
derived over the specified time history for some of the compa-
nies referred to earlier, to exclude R&D expenditure (where 
known), interest, depreciation & amortisation.    
Accounts of BAE Systems and some other companies do not 
include an item for selling and administration. For the smaller 
companies, information of FAME ‘other expenses’ was used as a 
basis to estimate Net Overheads, but it is not possible to be cer-
tain of the result without extensive investigation of individual 
accounts, which was precluded from this  research. The figure 
likely includes R&D, and some significant non-wage items, 
some non-recurring, which increases the potential for data scat-
ter.  
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Figure 6.  Percent Ratios to Added Value  
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Figure 5. Schematic Representation  
of Added Value and Overheads 
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Figure 7.  Net Overhead / Added Value Ratio % 
Annual data 15 companies 
Across the sample of years for each company, D&A as a percent 
of added value varied significantly about a mean of 4.4%. Firms 
with D&A/AV percent ratios in excess of this are those with 
manufacturing bases. They also may have significant R&D ex-
penditures.  
 
In engineering consultancies, overheads are high as a proportion 
of added value, compared to contracting orientated companies, 
and overhead recovery rates on project work are therefore also 
quite high.  
 
Figure 7 illustrates how the net overheads (NO) for selling & 
administration (not including D&A, R&D and interest) have 
varied with added value over the years for fifteen companies (not 
annotated). As stated earlier, net overhead include some charges 
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It is apparent that for some companies, the ratio has varied sig-
nificantly compared to some others.  As with the data on the AV/
T/O ratio, a measure of scatter for the NO/AV ratio can be calcu-
lated for each company’s historical record, by dividing the stan-
dard deviation by the mean value of the data years, with the 
proviso of the limitation placed by small samples. An average of 
all the company scatter figures is in the region of ±37%, ac-
counting for 2/3rd of the results. Likewise for the net overhead/
turnover ratio and the net overhead/wage cost ratio, the compara-
ble figures are ±30% and ±26% respectively. However, if one 
company’s results are excluded, because of possible unreliable/
skewed data, leaving 15 in the sample, the scatter results reduce 
to ±31% NO/AV, ±29% NO/T/O and ±25% NO/WC. About this 
band there are some companies with higher or lower scatter. 
 
Some reservation is held by the writer concerning what items are 
included in the FAME overhead data for some smaller compa-
nies. Very large profits or losses in one year can also skew added 
value figures, and potential errors can also arise from using 
small samples to calculate averages. An analyst, using company 
data to calculate supposed relationships of overheads to turn-
over, added value and wage costs, with which to compute poten-
tial overhead recovery from a claim, will need to tread with care.  
 
The two charts at figure 8 have been constructed to try to show 
the relationships between net overheads, added value and turn-
over for some companies. The points on chart A represent all the 
data in the sample years for each company.  
 
‘Best-fit’ relationships between net overhead/turnover and added 
value/turnover ratios have been added to the charts of the form: 
Figure 8. Relationships of Net Overhead  
(Ex D&A Interest and R&D)  





The slope of the line is likely to be a function of the NO/AV 
ratio, which rises as the added value/turnover ratio rises. The 
correlation coefficient is not very high, but is improved if the 
averages for each company are plotted instead individual annual 
data, as per chart B. 
 
Proceeding further, recognising that net overheads are more 
likely to be related to added value than to turnover, charts can be 
drawn to link net overheads with wage costs and added value, 
and these are shown at figure 9. 
(A)   NO/TO % against AV/TO%





















At figure 9 ‘best-fit’ relationships between net overhead/wage 
costs and net overhead/added value have been added to the 




The slopes of the lines appears to be constant. They are likely to 
be a function of the added value/wage cost (AV/WC) mark-up 
ratio. The latter is unsurprising, given that wage costs constitute 
the major part of added value. The correlation coefficient is im-
proved if the averages for each company are plotted instead of 













(B)   NO/TO%  against AV/TO%
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If all of the above leads the reader to take a cautionary view 
concerning the safeness of relying on averages and trends for 
calculating the potential for a contribution to overhead, then the 
position for estimating profits is several times worse. Profit is 
calculated after deduction of all costs, and its variability will be a 
function of the combined variability of all the costs deducted, the 
level of output, and output prices. Figure 10 illustrates the vari-
ability of profit before tax as a proportion of turnover and added 
value for a selection of firms (not annotated). 
 
The charts show a significant amount of scatter. In the case of 
the  profit/turnover ratio, this is on average of the order of twice 
the mean. That is, for a company with a mean percent ratio of 
say 2.5% profit/turnover, 2/3rd of the results might occur with in 
a band of –2.5% up to +7.5%. In the case of profit/added value, 
scatter is about three times the mean. Thus for a company with a 
mean percent ratio of say 5%, 2/3rd of the results might occur 
within a band of –10% up to +20%. Clearly, however, some 
firms experience scatter significantly outside this level. Caution 
should be exercised therefore in forming a view on an average 
level of profit to be assumed. 
 
Overhead Recovery 
Where the Court deems that a contractor is entitled to be com-
pensated in some way for owner-caused delay, there are a num-
ber of issues to be addressed concerning recovery of costs, over-
heads and profit.  
 
First, mostly in the case of shorter-term delays, in addition to the 
costs of payment of direct labour resources for being idle, head 
office employees might be involved in some additional costs 
such as overtime, travel and consultancy.  
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Figure 10. Profit  before Tax as function of   
Turnover and Added Value 















1 992 1 994 1 996 1 998 2000 2002







0 4 08 01 2 0
NO/AV %
Figure 9. Relationships of Net Overhead  
(Ex D&A Interest and R&D)  
to Wage Costs and Added Value  
(A)   NO/WC% against NO/AV%
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The latter costs centre very much around a limited number of 
people. They are more likely to be relatively easy to highlight 
and detail, though this does depend upon the records that a con-
tractor has kept. 
 
Second, more particularly in longer-term delays, of unknown 
duration at outset, the question to consider is the quantification 
of the potential loss of opportunity for a contractor to undertake 
other worthwhile projects, which will, it is to be hoped, eventu-
ally contribute towards recovery of overheads and to profit. It is 
to be assumed that the Court will look for some evidence of the 
results of the consequences of a delay in terms of reduced pro-
ject cash flow or tenders not taken up.  
 
Referring to the schematic diagram at figure 5, while costs may 
be expended on employment of people in selling, R&D and ad-
ministration functions, these are not being covered during the 
delay, and an employer might be under pressure to reduce them. 
Borrowings might rise entailing increased interest to be paid. 
Other costs such as rent and utility costs would continue. Clearly 
if the contract took a major part of total turnover for a company, 
as can happen in large scale engineering contracts, then an en-
forced delay outside of its control could have serious conse-
quences for a contractor in terms of profit and cash-flow. 
 
Additional points arising from the research in this paper are first, 
that variability of data is likely to confer only limited links be-
tween some financial variables, and little for others. Thus simple 
solutions are likely to be more beneficial. Second, factors fa-
voured as being more closely linked to net overheads are added 
value and wage costs. Overheads for a contractor that subcon-
tracts 80% of its work are less likely to be related to turnover 
than to added value or own wage costs. Project Account 2.5 years 
  £M 
Subcontract/bought-out cost  134 
Direct wage cost  40 
Total Direct Cost  174 
Overhead, profit, depr mark-up   26 
Contract Value  200 
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Third, where liability to recovery of profit and non-wage items 
has been agreed, inclusion of items such as D&A must be con-
sidered. A more longer-time form of expenditure for the future is 
that of R&D, where returns may potentially be high, but are 
regarded as speculative. It might be difficult for a firm to quan-
tify the lost opportunity of a return on an investment in R&D 
foregone from a contract delay. Specific consideration of items 
such as depreciation and R&D expenditure might be beneficial. 
 
Where liability to recovery of profit and non-wage items has not 
been agreed, then it might be argued that only head office execu-
tive manpower and other costs directly involved or tied up by the 
contract can be included, with the rest of overheads being ex-
cluded.  
Overhead/Profit Formulae 
The use of formulae to estimate the lost opportunity  to recover 
overheads and profit associated with a project delay has been 
common for many years. The formulae are generally simple to 
use, and are favoured by contractors. They may not find favour 
with owners, on account of the difficulty in proving that such 
opportunity losses have resulted from a delay. 
 
The formulae used fall into two schools; those structured around 
the time lost from a delay, such as Hudson, Eichleay and Emden, 
and those structured around a cost basis, such as Ernstrom, Car-
teret and Allegheny
2. There is no one formula agreed by practi-







B × × = +    owed     profit) (      Overhead
where O equals actual total overhead for the contract period (all 
projects), La the total labour cost for the contract period (all pro-
jects), and Ld the labour cost during the delay. A possible prob-
lem with this formula is in deciding which labour costs should 
be applied. Should the total labour costs be included, including 
all subcontract labour, or should they relate only to direct labour 
costs inside an added value definition?  
 
Carteret and Allegheny assume that there is a difference between 
the overhead rate during a delay period and the planned or actual 
rate. Carteret applies the differential to the cost of work during 
the delay period,  and Allegheny applies this to the original con-
tract value. These are complicated formulae to apply. One prob-
lem is that if no differential overhead rate can be shown, then no 
loss in opportunity can be shown to have occurred. Overhead 
rates might have declined in the delay period, because a contrac-
tor had pruned costs to mitigate potential losses. 
where B represents billings/contract value, O represents com-
pany overheads (sometimes including profit), T represents total 
company turnover, td  is the delay period and tc is the contract 
period.  
 
In the Hudson formula, the original contract value is inserted for 
B, the ratio of overhead (+profit if necessary)/turnover is that 
specified in the original contract (and does not therefore neces-
sarily relate to actual performance of a contractor in the conduct 
of its business. This is also its main disadvantage. tc is the origi-
nal planned contract time.  
 
In the original Eichleay formula, actual contract billings are 
inserted for B, and the ratio O/T is that of actual overheads over 
the contract period (including the delay) divided by total com-
pany contract billings over the same period. tc is the actual con-
tract time (including the delay). The weakness of this formula is 
that for delays of any significant length, the level of overhead 
claimed is effectively watered down, and an under-claim may 
occur. The formula has since been modified
2 and now has simi-
larities to the Emden formula.  
 
In the Emden formula, B is represented by contract value, as 
with Hudson, but the ratio O/T is represented by the average rate 
of overhead (+ profit) to turnover as shown in the company ac-
counts. tc is the original planned contract time.  
2. Overhead Formulae 
Hudson  
J F Finnegan, Ltd , V . Sheffield City Council, 43 Build. L.R. 124 (Q.B. 1989) 
Eichleay 
Eichleay Corporation, ASBCA No. 5183, 60-2 BCA (CCH) ¶2688 (1960) 
Eichleay Modified 
Capital Electric Co. V. United States, 729 F.2d 743 (Fed. Cir., 1984) 
Emden 
Alfred McAlpine Homes North, Ltd. V. Property  & Land Contractors, Ltd. 76 BLR 
59 (1995) 
Ernstrom 
The Construction Lawyer, Volume 3, Number 1, Winter 1982 
Carteret 
Carteret Work Uniforms, Inc., ASBCA No. 1647, 6 CCF §61,651-1951 (1954) 
Allegheny 
Allegheny Sportswear Co., ASBCA No. 4163, 58-1 BCA (CCVH) ¶1684 (1958) 
In all of the time-based formulae it is assumed that no contribu-
tion may arise from the contract during the whole of the delay. 
In real life however a delay might not always have such an dra-
matic on/off effect, but exhibit more gradual build-ups and re-
sumptions.  Detail of this can often be obtained via appropriate 
PERT/CPA analysis.  
 
In contrast to time-based formulae, the Ernstrom formula is 
based on a supposed direct relation of overheads to labour costs. 
Thus: 
Added Value Formula  
A possible approach to calculating the lost contribution to over-
heads and profit is by reference to added value. To illustrate the 
principles the following company and project data is assumed: 
Company Accounts  1 Year 
  £M 
Turnover  1000 
Total Subcontract/Bought-out costs  700 
(of which overhead bought-out costs £30m)   
Added Value  300 
Total Wage Costs   250 
(of which direct wage costs £200m, overhead wage costs £50m)   
Depreciation     15 
Profit b Tax   35 
Net overhead ex depreciation  80 
(of which wage element £50m and bought-out element £30m)   
Overhead, profit & depreciation  130 
A mark-up of 14.94% is applied to total direct project costs to 
equate to contract value, thus recovering overheads (both wage 
and bought-out elements), depreciation and profit.  
 
If overheads within the company historical account can be split 
into own wage costs and bought-out costs & services (£50m and 
£30m in the above example), then these can deducted respec-
tively from total wage costs and from total subcontract/bought 
out costs, to produce net figures (£200m and £670m respectively 
in the example), equivalent in definition to the direct wage cost 
and subcontract/bought-out costs in the contract. Deduction of 
the net subcontract/bought-out costs from turnover and project 
value produces the following ‘adjusted’ added value figures: 
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       Company adjusted AV = £1000m - £670m  = £330m 
       Project AV                    =  £200m  - £134m  =  £66m 
 
It is assumed that an owner-caused delay of six months occurs to 
the original 2.5 year project and that the contract allows for re-
covery of  a contribution to overhead, depreciation and profit. 
 
The structure of the added value formula proposed is similar to 




where BAV  is the estimated adjusted added value of the contract, 
O/AV is the historic overhead/adjuested added value ratio for the 
company, td  is the delay period and tc is the original contract 
period. Substituting in figures, Overhead (+profit) owed: 
 
             = £66m x (£130m/£330m) x (0.5/2.5) = £5.2m 
 





 hence Overhead/profit owed: 
  
            =  £200m x  (£130m/£1000m) x (0.5/2.5) = £5.2m 
 
The two advantages of using an added value formula are: 
 
First, added value is more closely related to overheads than turn-
over, given that in the process plant contracting business a sig-
nificant amount of work is subcontracted. 
 
Second, in considering contracts that do not necessarily fit a 
contractor’s historic added value/turnover pattern. A contractor 
might take on a project where it provides either more or less of 
the added value than it normally does (with either a smaller or 
greater subcontract cost), and likely entailing an appropriately 
greater or lesser management input. In the event of an owner-
caused delay a greater or smaller recovery in overhead (+profit) 
levels might be indicated. Thus in the example chosen, if the 
estimated adjusted added value of the £200m project had been 
either £80m or £50m instead of £66m, using the added value 
formula, overhead/profit recovery calculations would have been 







B × × = +     owed       profit) (        Overhead
Added Value  Overhead Calculation  Amount claimed 
£50m  £50m x (£130m/£330m) x (0.5/2.5)  =  £3.94m 
£66m  £66m x (£130m/£330m) x (0.5/2.5)  =  £5.20m 
£80m  £80m x (£130m/£330m) x (0.5/2.5)  =  £6.30m 
Summary & Conclusion 
Recovery of contribution to head office overhead in owner-
caused delay situations has been a part of dispute resolution 
procedures for many years. A number of formulae have been in 
common use to simplify estimation of the contribution. They  do 
not, however, take particular account of the differing natures of 
the key players in the market, and the variable added value that 
each contributes to final output. 
 
This paper sets out to illustrate some of the dynamics of the mar-
ket in terms of added value, and to show how these relate to 
disputable items such as overheads and profits. A selection of 
different types of company—engineering consultants, contrac-
tors, manufacturers and constructors—was used to illustrate the 
principles. Analyses were carried out to try to pin-point the ma-
jor sources of potential errors attached to added value, overheads 
and profit. 
 
Following a brief overview of traditional formulae, a new formu-
lae is proposed, linking recovery of head office overheads to 
added value. It has advantages in using data more closely related 
to overheads and in being able to adjust for different project 
added value contents, but these can only be fully realised if over-
heads in company accounts can be broken down into wage and 
non-wage elements. If this is not possible, then use of the for-
mula alongside a traditional formula such as Emden is prefer-
able.  
Under the Emden formula, using turnover as a base, the same 
overhead recovery figure would have arisen regardless of the 
added value content of the project, bestowing a potential advan-
tage/disadvantage either to the contractor or to the owner in the 
dispute, depending upon the project resource make-up. 
 
A potential disadvantage of the added value formula is that it 
may not be possible to divide up historical records of overheads 
to separate out own wage costs from bought-out costs & ser-
vices. In this situation the only recourse is to use a historical 
company added value definition. Substituting in figures, the 
estimated Overhead (+profit) owed: 
 
             = £66m x (£130m/£300m) x (0.5/2.5) = £5.72m 
 
This clearly is an overestimate of the lost contribution, arising 
from the different definitions of project and company added 
value used. The options in this case are: 
 
•  Retain the added value formula, recognising its potential to 
over-estimate when subdivision of overheads is not possible, 
but allowing for different contract mixes. 
•  Abandon the added value formula in favour of Emden, rec-
ognising the more tenuous relation of overheads to turnover, 
and its inability to cater for different contract mixes. 
•  Use both formulae, and make adjustments to reflect the most 
likely position. 
Which allow for a reduced or increased recovery depending 
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